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 THE STRANGE CASE OF DR WATSON: LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF AI EVIDENCE-BASED 
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE 
Francesca Lagioia*and Giuseppe Contissa** 
This paper investigates the legal issues emerging from the adoption of clinical 
decision support systems (CDSS) based on artificial intelligence (AI). We explore 
a set of questions whose answers may affect the allocation of liability in 
misdiagnosis and/or improper treatment scenarios. The characteristic features 
of new-generation CDSS based on AI raise new challenges. In particular, the 
argument is made that a new shared decision-making authority model shall be 
adopted, in line with the analysis of the task–responsibility allocation. It is also 
suggested that the level of automation should be taken into account in 
classifying these systems under the European regulations on medical device 
software. This classification may indeed affect not only the certification 
procedures but also the allocation of liability. To this end, we finally design some 
scenarios providing variations on the possible causes of failure in the decision-
making process and the consequent liability assessment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ageing of population is becoming one of the most significant phenomena 
of the 21st century. Over the past decades, life expectancy has significantly 
increased: 12 per cent of the world population is currently over the age of 60, 
and by 2050 this percentage is expected to rise to 21.1 While this is a large 
triumph for modern science and medicine, it places a huge strain on the 
delivery of healthcare services, this owing to the increasing costs and the 
inexorable decrease in the number of medical personnel relative to the 
number of patients.2 The advent of big data and the artificial intelligence (AI) 
era is usually considered part of the solution. The increased focus on 
preventing medical errors, coupled with the introduction of clinical decision 
 
1 Love Patrick, OECD Insights Ageing Debate the Issues: Debate the Issues (OECD 
Publishing 2015). 
2 Ibid. 
 support systems (CDSS), has been pointed out as key to the effort to improve 
healthcare quality and patient safety.3 The adoption of CDSS for diagnosis and 
treatment should also facilitate evidence-based practice, which is regarded as 
the gold standard for decision-making in health care.4 
In this context, the IBM Watson system is one of the most promising AI 
technologies developed in recent years. Initially designed to compete with 
human champions at the Jeopardy! quiz show,5 Watson is currently being 
experimented as an evidence-based CDSS. It is based on the DeepQA 
technology, which exploits natural language processing and a variety of search 
techniques to analyse both unstructured information, for example natural 
language documents, and structured information, such as relational databases 
and knowledge bases.6 DeepQA is trained on a set of documents on which 
human experts annotate all instances of pairs of questions and answers. The 
system learns how to identify and correlate questions and answers on the basis 
of the examples within the training set. It applies the acquired knowledge in 
analysing new input questions and generates new possible candidate answers, 
through a broad search on massive volumes of information that have never 
been annotated. For each candidate answer a new hypothesis is generated. 
Then, for each hypothesis, DeepQA tries to find evidence that either supports 
or refutes the hypothesis in question. The process outputs a ranked list of 
candidate answers – a potential diagnosis – with an associated confidence 
score. 
This paper investigates some legal issues emerging from the adoption of 
Watson and similar AI CDSS in health care, especially as concerns medical 
practice and liability for accidents, calling for new models of allocating 
 
3 Linda T Kohn and others (eds), To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System 
(National Academies Press 2000). 
4 David L Sackett and others, Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't 
(British Medical Journal Publishing Group 1996). 
5 Jeopardy! is an American television game show based on a quiz competition in which 
contestants are presented with general knowledge clues in the form of answers, and 
must phrase their responses in the form of questions. David Ferrucci et al.,'Building 
Watson: An overview of the DeepQA project' (2010) AI magazine 31(3) 59-79. 
6 David Ferrucci, Anthony Levas, Sugato Bagchi, David, Gondek, and Erik T. Mueller, 
'Watson: beyond jeopardy!' (2013) Artificial Intelligence 199, 94 
 decision-making tasks between medical experts and AI systems. Even though 
the analysis is mainly focused on Watson, results can be extended to all AI CDSS 
systems sharing similar features.  
The liability for damages caused by AI systems has been addressed in a number 
of studies with regard to civil7 and criminal law,8 and recently also in legal 
disputes and legislative initiatives, such as the report on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics, issued by the legal affairs committee of the European Parliament,9 
the AI Strategy of the European Commission, and the High-Level Expert Groups 
on AI.10 However, the liability resulting from the use of AI systems in the health 
domain has mainly focused, with some exceptions,11 on robotic surgery, 
 
7 See, among others, Ugo Pagallo, The laws of robots (Springer 2013); Paulius Čerka, 
Grigienė  Jurgita, and Sirbikytė Gintarė,'Liability for damages caused by artificial 
intelligence' (2015) Computer Law & Security Review 31(3) 376-389. 
8 Ugo Pagallo, 'AI and bad robots: The criminology of automation' in The Routledge 
Handbook of Technology, Crime and Justice (Routledge 2017); Francesca Lagioia and 
Giovanni Sartor, 'AI Systems Under Criminal Law: a Legal Analysis and a Regulatory 
Perspective' (2019) Philosophy & Technology 1-33. 
9 P8_TA (2017)0051 Civil Law Rules on Robotics European Parliament resolution of 16 
February 2017, with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics 2015/2103 INL. 
10 On 25 April 2018, the EU Commission set up three different groups of experts on (i) 
the ethics of AI; (ii) whether and to what extent to amend the directive on liability 
for defective products; and, (iii) liability and new technologies formation 
(<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/high-level-expert-group-artificial- 
intelligence> accessed 27 June 2020. See also the Commission's document on 
Artificial intelligence: Commission outlines a European approach to boost investment 
and set ethical guidelines IP/18/3362; European Commission, White Paper On 
Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust (2020) (available 
at <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificial-
intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf> accessed 27 June 2020; European Commission, Report 
on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things 
and robotics (2020) COM(2020) 64 final. For an extensive literature analysis of the 
foreseeable threats of AI crimes see Thomas C King, Nikita Aggarwal, Mariarosaria 
Taddeo, and Luciano Floridi 'Artificial intelligence crime: An interdisciplinary analysis 
of foreseeable threats and solutions' (2018) 26(1) Science and engineering ethics 89-
120. 
11 Andreas Holzinger, 'Interactive machine learning for health informatics: when do we 
need the human-in- the-loop?' (2016) 3(2) Brain Informatics 119–131; W. Nicholson 
 telemedicine and smart prosthetics.12 Moreover, the literature is still 
fragmented and a comprehensive and unified approach is still missing. Indeed, 
in this context, the legal analysis requires a systemic approach in order to 
consider the functioning and goals of the health system, calling for a novel 
method for analysing the roles and tasks of the actors involved and the 
associated responsibilities. A socio-technical perspective13 — resulting from 
the combination of technical artefacts (surgical robots, decision-support 
systems, robotic prosthetics, etc.), human operators and users (physicians, 
paramedics, clinicians, caregivers, patients, etc.), and social artefacts (including 
laws, medical procedures, technical manuals, and institutions, such as 
hospitals, national institutes of health, and regulatory agencies) — provides the 
means to investigate what activities are entrusted to AI CDSS and the role that 
such systems play in health care.  
In this paper, this perspective is adopted in order to explore a set of questions 
whose answers may heavily affect the allocation of liability in misdiagnosis 
and/or improper treatment scenarios. In particular, section 0 explores the 
distinctive features of AI based CDSS by comparison with traditional ones. This 
analysis is meant to provide the necessary technological framework for 
evaluating how and to what extent these new AI technologies can change the 
medical practice and the potential risks associated with this transformation. At 
the same time, given the potential of such technologies to be transformative, 
 
Price II, 'Regulating black-box medicine' (2017) Mich. L. Rev. 116, 421; Jason Millar 
and Ian Kerr, 'Delegation, Relinquishment and Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert 
Robots' (2013) Available at SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2234645> accessed 27 
June 2020. 
12 Andrea Bertolini, 'Robotic prostheses as products enhancing the rights of people with 
disabilities. Reconsidering the structure of liability rules' (2015) 29(2-3) International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 116-136; Shane O'Sullivan, Nathalie 
Nevejans, Colin Allen, Andrew Blyth, Simon Leonard, Ugo Pagallo, Katharina 
Holzinger, Andreas Holzinger, Mohammed Imran Sajid, and Hutan Ashrafian, 'Legal, 
regulatory, and ethical frameworks for development of standards in artificial 
intelligence (AI) and autonomous robotic surgery' (2019) The International Journal of 
Medical Robotics and Computer Assisted Surgery 15(1) e1968. 
13 Pieter Vermaas, Peter Kroes, Ibo van de Poel, Maarten Franssen, and Wybo Houkes, 
'A philosophy of technology: from technical artefacts to sociotechnical systems' 
(2011) in Synthesis Lectures on Engineers, Technology, and Society, VI(1) 1-134, 70. 
 there is the need to analyse how they are regulated by the existing legal 
framework and whether it is adequate or fail to provide appropriate solutions 
and guidance. Thus, section 0 deals with the legal qualification and the 
conformity-assessment procedure of AI based CDSS under the European 
Regulation on medical device software. This analysis is meant to evaluate 
whether additional criteria for classifying these systems are needed and how 
they can influence the certification procedures and medical liability as well.  
Once the analysis of the specific technological features of AI CDSS and the 
regulatory framework governing their classification and certification is 
completed, the focus will fall on the allocation of tasks and activities and on 
the interaction between medical experts and AI CDSS. In particular, section 0 
explores how and to what extent the level of automation may affect the 
allocation of liability. The analysis shall consider what activities are being 
delegated to the Watson system, as an example of AI CDSS, and what changes 
this introduces into interactions, and what new capacities and power relations 
are consequently engendered. This investigation is meant to address the 
connection between delegation and responsibilities and the relations of 
influence, leading to different legal responsibilities.  
Section 5 investigates whether and to what extent the features of the Watson 
system raise questions with regard to the source of decision-making authority. 
Section 0 designs some scenarios, providing variations on the possible causes 
of failure in the decision-making process and the consequent liability 
assessment. It may be the case that, under the current legal regimes and 
without adequate adjustments, the allocation of liability will end up being 
unfair or inefficient. The adoption of a socio-technical perspective and the 
resulting liability analysis may be viewed as a governance mechanism14 by 
which to enhance the functioning of the healthcare system. 
2. DR WATSON VS TRADITIONAL CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
This section considers the CDSS as a technological component of the healthcare 
socio-technical system (STS). It focuses on the comparison between Watson, 
 
14 Gordon Baxter and Ian Sommerville, 'Socio-technical systems: From design methods 
to systems engineering' 23(1) in Interacting with Computers (2011) 4–17. 
 as an example of new-generation AI CDSS, and those based on the more 
traditional knowledge-based approach. As mentioned above, this analysis is 
meant to provide the necessary framework for assessing how and to what 
extent these new AI technologies can transform medical practice and pose new 
risks.  
In particular, three main features are identified that distinguish Watson, and 
all the new AI CDSS, from traditional expert systems.15 They are based on the 
formal representation of the specific domain knowledge: (1) the data-driven 
approach, (2) unpredictability by design, and (3) the possible stronger impact 
on the decision-making process. All these features pose new questions with 
regard to medical practice and the regulatory framework, under which current 
rules may fail to provide appropriate governance mechanisms.  
1. The data-driven approach 
The first feature pertains the widespread adoption of data-driven methods in 
AI research and development, which are gradually replacing the traditional 
knowledge-based approach in specific domains of application. Traditional 
decision-support systems are computer-based information systems that use 
expert knowledge to attain high-level decision performance in a structured and 
narrow problem domain.16 As a result, such systems are suitable for dealing 
with, and providing advice on, repetitive problem areas, rather than with ad 
hoc and unique situations.  
Human expertise has to be elicited and represented symbolically. In particular, 
symbolic reasoning is based on algorithms to make inferences grounded in the 
knowledge base using forward chaining (from data to conclusion) and 
backward chaining (from conclusion to data).17 Such expert systems are 
typically based on classical procedural algorithms. The first examples were 
MYCIN and ONCOCIN, both developed at Stanford University in the early 1980s. 
 
15 For an overview on traditional expert systems see Jay E Aronson, Ting-Peng Liang, 
and Richard V. MacCarthy, Decision Support Systems and Intelligent Systems 
(Pearson Prentice-Hall 2005), ch. 3, 103ff. 
16 Jay E Aronson, Ting-Peng Liang, and Richard V. MacCarthy, Decision Support Systems 
and Intelligent Systems (Pearson Prentice-Hall 2005) 549. 
17 Ibid.  
 In particular, the MYCIN system was developed to identify bacteria causing 
blood infections to arrive at a probable diagnosis, based on reported symptoms 
and medical test results, and to recommend a course of treatment.18 Similarly, 
ONCOCIN was an oncology-protocol management system designed to assist 
physicians in the treatment of cancer patients through a rule-based reasoner 
that encompasses the necessary knowledge of cancer chemotherapy. In 
generating its recommendation, the system combined initial data about the 
patient's diagnosis, results of laboratory tests, and the protocol-specific 
information in its knowledge base.19  
Despite the great interests and appeal generated by these technologies and 
applications, they have not fundamentally transformed medical practice. This 
is mainly due to the so-called knowledge representation bottleneck: in order 
to build a successful application, the required information — including tacit and 
common-sense knowledge — had to be represented in advance using 
formalised languages. This proved to be very difficult, and in many cases 
impractical or impossible, also due to the endlessness evolution of medicine 
and new discoveries in medical science. 
In the last decade, the focus of AI research has shifted to the possibility of 
applying machine-learning algorithms to vast amounts of data making an 
impressive leap forward. Data-driven AI systems, like Watson, use big-data 
analytics and data-mining techniques to discover patterns, with the help of 
machine-learning algorithms and statistics. Given the massive amount of 
processed structured and unstructured information, such systems are able to 
infer rules from data and develop models for making classifications, 
predictions, and decisions. It is important to note that these AI systems present 
a high level of complexity. First of all, they are not a single technology but 
rather a diverse set of different technologies.20 For instance, the Watson 
 
18 Edward Hance Shortliffe, MYCIN: A Rule-Based Computer Program for Advising 
Physicians regarding Antimicrobial Therapy Selection (Stanford University 
Department of Computer Science 1974). 
19 Edward H Shortliffe and others, 'An Expert System for Oncology Protocol 
Management' in BG Buchanan and EH Shortiffe (eds) Rule-Based Expert Systems: The 
MYCIN Experiments of the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project (1984) 656. 
20 The complexity AI systems is reflected in the multipliticy of components, software, 
parts, combined together. See, European Commission, Report on the safety and 
 system includes the Deep QA architecture, which goes from question analysis 
and answer type determination to search and then answer selection, and the 
Apache Unstructured Management Architecture (UIMA)21 for content 
analytics. The latter provides a component software architecture for the 
development, discovery, composition, and deployment of multi-modal 
analytics for the analysis of unstructured information and integration with 
search technologies. Furthermore, these different technologies and 
components are in turn based on a combination of a variety of methods and 
algorithms performing their various functions. For instance, for the Jeopardy 
Challenge, computer scientists working on Watson used more than 100 
different techniques for analysing natural language, identifying sources, 
generating hypotheses, finding and scoring evidence, and merging and ranking 
hypotheses.22  
A further dimension of this complexity concerns the internal complexity of the 
algorithms involved and the composition of the training sets used by such 
systems to learn methods for achieving their goals. It may be increasingly 
difficult to identify the source of possible problems and what ultimately caused 
harms and injuries. 
2. Unpredictability by design 
The second feature, unpredictability by design, stems from the previous one. 
The reason is twofold: first of all, data-driven AI systems are able to learn and 
infer rules from data and make predictions on those data, rather than working 
on a set of predefined if-then rules, and secondly, they are trained on 
constantly changing datasets.23 Algorithms may evolve through self-learning by 
developing new heuristics (problem-solving strategies) and modifying their 
 
liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things and robotics 
(2020) COM(2020) 64 final, 2. 
21 David Ferrucci, and Adam Lally, 'UIMA: An Architectural Approach to Unstructured 
Information Processing in the Corporate Research Environment' (2004) 10(3–4) 
Natural Language Engineering 327–348. 
22 David Ferrucci et al. 'Building Watson: An overview of the DeepQA project' (2010) 
31(3) AI magazine 59-79. 
23 Jason Millar, and Ian Kerr, 'Delegation, relinquishment, and responsibility: The 
prospect of expert robots', in Robot Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 107. 
 internal data and structure, or even by generating new algorithms.24 
Furthermore, due to their nature, such systems are open, since they often 
interact with other systems or data sources in order to function properly, thus 
allowing external input either via some hardware plug or through some 
wireless connection, and they come as hybrid combinations of hardware, 
software, continuous software updates, and various continuous services.25 
Machine-learning-based (ML-based) systems present both advantages and 
disadvantages if compared to classical rule-based systems. The former are 
easier to develop and maintain, but the possible outputs are not fully 
predictable, and the systems' behaviour cannot be fully explained by reference 
to the source code. Indeed, such systems are designed to respond to, identify, 
and classify new and not necessarily predefined stimuli and to link them to a 
corresponding decision, selected among all the possible decisions. Moreover, 
they do not have the capability to explain the reasoning process behind the 
decision-making, a capability that is necessary for understanding why decisions 
are made in a certain way and providing explanations to their users (which are 
required by physicians). 
As a result, AI-based CDSS, opaque by their nature,26 enable so-called black-
box medicine, since grounds for decisions are at least partly unknown and 
 
24 For instance, genetic algorithms are the most widely used form of evolutionary 
computation for medical applications. They are a class of stochastic search and 
optimisation algorithms based on natural biological evolution. They work by creating 
many random solutions to the problem at hand. This population of many solutions 
will then evolve from one generation to the next, ultimately arriving at a satisfactory 
solution to the problem. The best solutions are added to the population while the 
inferior ones are eliminated. The process is repeated among the better elements, so 
that improvements will occur in the population, survive and generate new solutions. 
Genetic algorithms are applied to perform several types of tasks like diagnosis and 
prognosis, medical imaging and signal processing. See, for example, Ramesh, A.N., 
Kambhampati, C., Monson, J. RT and Drew, P.J. 'Artificial intelligence in medicine' 
(2004) 86(5) Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England 334. 
25 See the Report commissioned by the EU Commission: Expert Group on Liability and 
New Technologies – New Technologies Formation (2019) 'Liability for Artificial 
Intelligence and other emerging digital technologies' 33. 
26 W. Nicholson Price II, 'Black-Box Medicine', (2015) 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 433 
 unknowable.27 As will be discussed in section 0, these characteristics raise new 
issues, in particular with regard to AI transparency, trustworthiness, and 
accountability,28 complicating the possibility of discovering the reasons behind 
AI evaluations and decisions and thus establishing the causes of potential 
failures in the diagnosis and treatment process.  
3. Impact on the decision-making process 
The third feature concerns the possible impact of AI technologies on the 
decision-making process. Experiments done at the Sloan-Kettering Hospital in 
the United States suggest that Watson diagnoses are better and more accurate 
than those of physicians. 
According to Sloan-Kettering, only around 20 per cent of the knowledge that 
human doctors use when diagnosing patients and deciding on treatments relies 
on trial-based evidence. It would take at least 160 hours of reading a week just 
to keep up with new medical knowledge as it is published, let alone consider 
its relevance or apply it practically. Watson's ability to absorb this information 
faster than any human should, in theory, fix a flaw in the current healthcare 
model. Wellpoint's Samuel Nessbaum has claimed that, in tests, Watson's 
successful diagnosis rate for lung cancer is 90 per cent, compared to 50 per 
cent for human doctors.29  
As a result, three key factors can be identified that may strongly influence the 
decision-making process. The first factor is the ability of  Watson and similar 
AI-based CDSS to overcome human cognitive limitations in collecting and 
processing information. The second one consists in thier capacity to 
outperform human doctors in diagnosis.  The last one pertains the adoption of 
 
27 W. Nicholson Price II, 'Describing Black-Box Medicine' (2015) 21 BUJ Sci. & Tech. L. 
347; Alex John London, 'Artificial intelligence and black‐box medical decisions: 
accuracy versus explainability' (2019) 49(1) Hastings Center Report 15-21. 
28 For a recent contribution on the importance of robotics transparency, interpretability 
and accountability see Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Luciano Floridi, 
'Transparent, explainable, and accountable AI for robotics' (2017) 2(6) Science 
Robotics. 
29 Ian Steadman, 'IBM's Watson Is Better at Diagnosing Cancer Than Human Doctors' 
(Wired, 11 February 2013) <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ibm-watson-medical-
doctor> accessed 27 June 2020. 
 an evidence-based approach, focused on clinical trials, in making diagnoses and 
recommending treatment. The latter is often considered as a strong argument 
for justifying and trusting the decision-making of the system, as examined in 
the following sections.  
Given the potential impact of these technologies on medical practice, there is 
the need to examine the existing regulatory framework in order to evaluate 
whether it is adequate or may fail to provide appropriate governance 
mechanisms.  
3. THE EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON MEDICAL DEVICE SOFTWARE: ITS LEGAL 
QUALIFICATION AND THE CONFORMITY-ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE 
This section deals with the social component of the healthcare STS. In 
particular, it analyses the legal qualification and the conformity-assessment 
procedure of AI CDSS like Watson under European Regulation 2017/745.30  
The certification procedure sets the necessary requirement for obtaining the 
European Conformity (CE) mark, through which a medical device is certified as 
compliant with product-safety and performance requirements. The analysis is 
meant to assess whether additional criteria for classifying these systems are 
needed and how they can affect the certification procedures, in which lies the 
necessary requirement for placing a medical device on the market. We shall 
also examine how the mentioned criteria and the certification processes may 
impact on medical liability in case of technological failures and more generally 
in misdiagnosis and/or improper treatment scenarios. 
1. The legal qualification 
According to Article 2(1) of the Regulation, Watson can be classified as a 
medical device for diagnostic, prediction, and treatment purposes.31 Under the 
 
30 Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 
2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 
90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC. It will be applicable three years after its entry into force, 
i.e. 25 May 2017. 
31 Under Article 2(1) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/745, a medical device is defined as 
'any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, implant, reagent, material or other 
 Regulation, medical devices can be sorted into four different classes — class I 
(low risk), class IIa (moderate risk), class IIb (medium risk), and class III (high 
risk) — depending on the purpose of the device and its inherent risks. In 
particular, Annex VIII sets out three main classification criteria, which take into 
account (1) the duration of use (e.g. transient, short-term, long-term); (2) 
whether the device is invasive (i.e. any device which, in whole or in part, 
penetrates inside the body, either through a body orifice or through the surface 
of the body); and (3) whether the device is active (i.e. whether a device 
depends on a source of electrical energy or any source of power other than 
that directly generated by the human body or by gravity and works by 
converting this energy). For example, enema kits and elastic bandages fall 
under class I devices, because their potential for harm is minimal. Conversely, 
devices sustaining or supporting life, such as implantable pacemakers and 
breast implants, fall under class III, given their higher potential risks for 
patients' life and well-being. 
According to Rule 11 of Annex VIII, decision-support systems generally fall 
under class IIa devices (moderate risk), unless they may seriously affect the 
patient's state of health, in which case they may fall under class IIb (medium 
risk) or class III (high risk).32 
 
article intended by the manufacturer to be used, alone or in combination, for human 
beings for one or more of the following specific medical purposes: — diagnosis, 
prevention, monitoring, prediction, prognosis, treatment or alleviation of disease, — 
diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of, or compensation for, an injury or 
disability [...].' Rule 11 of Annex VIII of the Regulation (EU) 2017/745 reads: 'Software 
intended to provide information which is used to take decisions with diagnosis or 
therapeutic purposes is classified as class IIa, except if such decisions have an impact 
that may cause: — death or an irreversible deterioration of a person's state of health, 
in which case it is in class III; or — a serious deterioration of a person's state of health 
or a surgical intervention, in which case it is classified as class IIb. Software intended 
to monitor physiological processes is classified as class IIa, except if it is intended for 
monitoring of vital physiological parameters, where the nature of variations of those 
parameters is such that it could result in immediate danger to the patient, in which 
case it is classified as class IIb. All other software is classified as class I.' 
32 See ch V, sec 1, art 51, of Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices. 
 In combination with the classification criteria in Annex VII, the definition 
provided in Rule 11 presents some challenges. First, under Rule 11, Watson 
cannot be clearly classified as a class III device. This classification appears to be 
predicated on an assessment as to whether patients can suffer irreversible 
damage to their health or a serious deterioration in their state of health. 
However, this assessment can only be made on a case-by-case basis, depending 
on the patient's specific clinical situation, and only once the design phase is 
completed. It may not always be possible to determine, for example, whether 
in the event of a patient's death, the latter is the consequence of a misdiagnosis 
and/or treatment or of the clinical course of the specific pathology. 
Second, the level of risk posed by a device depends on its intended use, which 
is determined on the basis of the claims made by the manufacturer in labelling 
the device. In the case of AI CDSS, the risk associated with the device does not 
arise from physical interaction with the patient's body but rather from the way 
the AI recommendations are used by clinicians and from their influence on the 
decision-making process. Thus, in evaluating the risk level of AI CDSS, the 
parameter should be based on the accuracy of the data provided and the 
intended impact on a physician's clinical decision-making. 
Focusing on the classification criteria specified in Annex VII, it is important to 
note that the level of automation of a medical device in no way influences its 
risk class. However, as better specified and analysed in sections 0, 0, and 0 the 
level of automation deeply affects the division of tasks between humans and 
machines in performing different cognitive functions, including acquiring and 
analysing information, making decisions, and acting on them. Delegation is in 
fact a risk, since its rationality closely depends not only on the likelihood of 
properly achieving a certain objective but also on the costs associated with a 
possible failure.33 No doubt, in the health context, a misdiagnosis, with the 
consequent failure to deliver the appropriate medical treatment, poses a high 
risk to the patient's health and safety. 
AI CDSS are characterised by a high level of automation, particularly with 
regard to certain cognitive functions, such as the acquisition and analysis of 
information and the decision-making process (see section 0). These levels 
 
33 Cristiano Castelfranchi and Rino Falcone,'Towards a Theory of Delegation for Agent-
Based Systems (1998) 24(3–4) Robotics and Autonomous Systems 141. 
 affect the degree of the associated risks, with regard to (i) the way AI CDSS 
affect the traditional decision-making process; (ii) transparency issues and 
medical awareness (as discussed in section 0); and (iii) possible technological 
failures, misdiagnosis, or wrong-treatment scenarios. Consider, for instance, a 
computer-aided detection device like the AlertWatch:OR, which is intended for 
'secondary monitoring of patients within operating rooms and by supervising 
anaesthesiologists outside of operating rooms'.34 These devices pose moderate 
risks by comparison with the risks posed by systems like Watson, which do not 
simply provide additional information but also suggest and indicate a specific 
clinical decision to be made. Thus, AI CDSS for diagnosis and medical treatment 
should not be classified under the same risk class as former CDSS devices. 
The level of automation in AI CDSS also affects the degree of risk with regard 
to transparency and medical awareness. This is especially the case given that 
AI lacks the ability to explain the internal reasoning process behind the 
decision-making, which should support diagnosis and treatment 
recommendations (see sections 2 and 0). In addition, there are risks associated  
with possible technological failures, misdiagnosis, or wrong-treatment 
scenarios, which may significantly affect patients' health and safety. 
It clearly appears that the level of automation of a medical device should be 
considered an essential parameter for properly assessing the risk class of AI-
based medical devices. This is even more so if it is considered that a different 
conformity-assessment procedure is defined for each class depending on the 
associated inherent risk, as discussed in the following section. 
2. The conformity-assessment procedures 
According to Article 2 of EU Regulation 2017/745, conformity assessment 
means the process demonstrating whether the legal requirements relating to 
a device have been fulfilled. 
 
34 Sachin Kheterpal, Amy Shanks, and Kevin K Tremper,'Impact of a Novel 
Multiparameter Decision Support System on Intraoperative Processes of care and 
Postoperative Outcomes” (2018) 128(2) Anesthesiology: The Journal of the American 
Society of Anesthesiologists 272. 
 This process ranges from a basic conformity-assessment procedure for class I 
devices to a full quality assurance for class III devices (Article 52).35 In the first 
case, the assessment of compliance with the Regulation can be carried out 
under the sole responsibility of the manufacturer, with regard to what the 
manufacturer claims in the EU declaration of conformity (Article 19 of the 
Directive). In the second case, however, the full quality-assessment procedure 
demands the involvement of both a notified body and an expert panel in 
evaluating and verifying the performance and the clinical safety of a medical 
device, including its ability to achieve its intended purpose as claimed by the 
manufacturer through labels, instructions for use, and the assessment of 
benefits and risks. Indeed, as specified in Article 2(52) the clinical performance 
of a device refers to its ability 'to achieve its intended purpose as claimed by 
the manufacturer, thereby leading to a clinical benefit for patients, when used 
as intended by the manufacturer', as resulting 'from any direct or indirect 
 
35 Given the lower risk level in the first case, i.e. devices in class I, the conformity-
assessment procedure can be carried out under the sole responsibility of the 
manufacturer (art 19). Under class IIa, the manufacturer is required to establish and 
implement a quality management system (annex IX ch. I and III), and provide 
technical documentation for representative devices, without expert review. The 
notified body must approve and periodically audit (surveillance assessment) the 
quality-management system and assess its conformity with the required standard 
(alternatively, a manufacturer may provide technical documentation aligned with 
annexes II and III and select a conformity-assessment avenue based on annex XI). The 
conformity-assessment procedure for a class IIb non-active and non-implantable 
device is identical to the procedure for a class IIa (chs I and III of annex IX). In the case 
of implantable devices, the technical documentation must be provided for every 
device without expert review. In the case of active devices, the technical 
documentation must be provided for every device with expert panel involvement. 
Generally, manufacturers of class III devices are subject to a conformity assessment 
as specified in annex IX, including full quality assurance audit and full technical 
documentation review. Additionally, for class III implantable devices, an expert panel 
is involved in the evaluation. While standards are voluntary, one way of presuming 
conformity to the GSPR (General Safety and Performance Requirements in annex I) 
and meeting the provisions of full quality assurance is to obtain a harmonized EN ISO 
13485 standard certification (alternatively, the manufacturer may choose to apply a 
conformity assessment as specified in annex X (Type-Examination) coupled with a 
conformity quality management assessment focused on production and controls, as 
specified in annex XI). 
 medical effects which stem from its technical or functional characteristics, 
including diagnostic characteristics'. 
The full quality-assessment procedure secures the highest level of security and 
safety guarantees, creating reasonable expectations regarding both the 
functioning and the trustworthiness of class III medical devices. This reasonable 
expectation, as well as the role played by the notified body and the expert 
panel, may significantly affect the liability assessment in case of injuries 
suffered by patients as a consequence of the use of class III devices, for 
example through a technological failure. 
In this scenario, the conformity-assessment procedure can affect the 
applicability of the legitimate expectation principle.36 According to Article 6 of 
Council Directive 85/374/EEC, on liability for defective products, a legitimate 
expectation is determined by circumstances such as (a) the presentation of the 
product; (b) its intended use; and (c) the state of the art at the time it was put 
into circulation. Additionally, under Article 3 of Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 
the conformity of a product to the general safety requirement is to be assessed 
by taking account of multiple elements, including (a) national and European 
standards, (b) the Commission recommendations setting guidelines on product 
safety assessment, (c) product safety codes of good practice in force in the 
sector concerned; (d) the state of the art and technology; and (e) reasonable 
expectations about safety. 
In particular, the CE mark may impact the applicability of the legitimate 
expectation principle in different ways depending on whether it assumes a 
merely formal or a substantive nature. If conformity is assessed under the sole 
responsibility of the manufacturer, then the CE mark should only have formal 
relevance. Conversely, whenever the procedure demands the involvement of 
both the notified body and the expert panel, under the full quality-assurance 
procedure the CE label should assume substantive relevance. The substantive 
nature of the certification is crucial to enabling the applicability of the 
legitimate expectation principle as a liability shield for physicians in the event 
 
36 For an application of the legitimate expectation principle in product liability, see the 
UK decision A & Others v National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289, and the 
advocate general's opinion in CJEU Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13 Boston 
Scientific Medizintechnik [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:148. 
 of technological failure.37 Since the class III classification of Watson raises some 
difficulties, the applicability of the legitimate expectation principle remains 
uncertain, simply in view of the high-risk class. 
As noted, the conformity assessment procedure affects the expected level of 
product safety and quality. We believe that rather than focusing on the 
intended use of medical devices, the classification criterion should take into 
account the level of automation and how clinicians use the device in practice, 
including the extent to which they may impact, affect, and even guide their 
decisions. In conclusion, AI CDSS like Watson, which have high levels of 
automation related to different cognitive functions, should be classified under 
class III. The highest level — the level afforded by the full quality-assurance 
procedure — would act as a guarantee not only for physicians, enhancing the 
reliability of AI CDSS and allowing for the applicability of the legitimate 
expectation principle, but also for patients, ensuring a higher level of safety. In 
line with the above, the High Level Independent Expert Group on AI, set up by 
the European Commission, recently published a set of Guidelines for 
Trustworthy AI, highlighting the need for certification procedures that should 
apply standards developed for different application domains and AI 
techniques, appropriately aligned with industrial and societal standards in 
different contexts.38  
4. THE LEVEL OF AUTOMATION AS A TASK-RESPONSIBILITY CRITERION 
This section explores the interaction between AI systems and human operators 
to investigate how and to what extent the level of automation may affect the 
allocation of liability. As mentioned above, the healthcare system can be 
 
37 The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, sez. IV, ruling no 18140/2012, stated that in 
the event of death caused by a defective medical device carrying a CE mark, it should 
be possible to apply the legitimate expectation doctrine, unless the defect is manifest 
and readily recognisable. In ruling no 40897/2011, the same court stated that with 
the full quality assurance procedure, the CE mark for class III devices would assume 
substantive relevance, since it provides the basis for legitimate expectation and the 
relationship of trust between the doctor-user and the notified body. 
38 HLEG, A. I. Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI. B-1049 Brussels, 2019. 
 described as a complex STS, combining technological artefacts, social artefacts, 
and humans.39  
Technological artefacts, which to some extent involve the use of automated 
tools and machines, determine what can be done in and by an organization, 
amplifying and constraining opportunities for action according to the level of 
automation of the technology at issue. Social artefacts, including norms and 
institutions, determine what should be done, governing tasks, obligations, 
goals, priorities, and institutional powers. Humans play an essential role in the 
functioning of STSs, including health care, providing them with governance and 
maintenance and sustaining their operation.40 
In particular, the healthcare system is increasingly reliant on AI technologies, 
and it operates by interconnecting information systems, as well as by 
employing AI technologies, which sometimes replace humans, though they are 
more often part of human-machine interaction processes. 
In failure scenarios leading to patient injuries, a key aspect that should be 
considered in allocating liability is the level of automation of technological 
artefacts, since they may affect how the decision-making process is split 
between human experts (e.g. physicians) and AI systems. This is strictly related 
to the allocation of task-responsibilities, namely the allocation of duties 
pertaining to the correct performance of a certain task or role. 
On the one hand, the violation of such duties may result in personal liability for 
human experts.41 Whenever there is a failure in a complex system, such a 
failure is usually connected with the non-execution or inadequate execution of 
a task, and with the natural or legal person responsible for that task. As a 
consequence of the failure to comply with their task-responsibilities, such 
persons may be subject to liability under civil and criminal law.  
 
39 Jan K.B. Olsen, Stig A. Pedersen, and Vincent F.A. Hendricks, Companion to the 
Philosophy of Technology (John Wiley & Sons 2012). 
40 Pieter Vermaas and others, 'A Philosophy of Technology: From Technical Artefacts to 
Sociotechnical Systems' (2011) 6(1) Synthesis Lectures on Engineers, Technology, and 
Society 1. 
41 Mark F. Grady, 'Why are people negligent? technology, nondurable precautions, and 
the medical malpractice explosion' (1987) (82) Nw. UL Rev. 293. 
 On the other side, it may be necessary to identify the task-responsibilities of AI 
systems, in other words the requirements they ought to meet. As task-
responsibilities are progressively delegated to technology, the risk of liability 
for damage and injuries contextually shifts from humans to the organisations 
that designed and developed the technology and defined its context and uses, 
and are responsible for its deployment, integration, maintenance, and 
certification. Thus, responsibilities may change relative to the changing 
functionalities and automation levels that devices are taking on through the 
implementation of AI. 
It is necessary to adopt a systematic approach42 for matching automation levels 
to the different responsibilities of both human experts and AI systems.43 Here, 
in order to determine how tasks ought to be allocated between human experts 
and AI CDSS, reliance is made on the Level Of Automation Taxonomy (LOAT),44 
based on the taxonomy developed by Endsley and Kaber,45 and on the 
principles set out by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens.46 
LOAT provides criteria for allocating tasks under four different cognitive 
functions: information acquisition (A), information analysis (B), decision-
making (C), and action implementation (D). Figure 1 illustrates a simplified 
version of LOAT.47 Each column starts with a 0-level of automation, 
 
42 Erik Hollnagel, 'The human in control: Modelling what goes right versus modelling 
what goes wrong' in Human Modelling in Assisted Transportation (Springer 2011) 3. 
43 Giuseppe Contissa and others, 'Liability and Automation: Issues and Challenges for 
Socio-Technical Systems' (2013) 2(1–2) Journal of Aerospace Operations 79.  
44 Luca Save and Beatrice Feuerberg,'Designing Human-Automation Interaction: A New 
Level of Automation Taxonomy' (2012), In Proc. Human Factors of Systems and 
Technology 2012. 
45 David B Kaber and Mica R Endsley, 'The Effects of Level of Automation and Adaptive 
Automation on Human Performance, Situation Awareness and Workload in a 
Dynamic Control Task' (2004) 5(2) Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science 113. 
46 Raja Parasuraman, Thomas B Sheridan, and Christopher D Wickens, 'A Model for 
Types and Levels of Human Interaction with Automation' (2000) 30(3) Systems, Man 
and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, IEEE Transactions  286. 
47 For a complete LOAT version see Luca Save and Beatrice Feuerberg,'Designing 
Human-Automation Interaction: A New Level of Automation Taxonomy' (2012) in 
Proc. Human Factors of Systems and Technology 2012 (n. 44).  
 corresponding to a fully manual performance of a certain task, without any 
technical support. 
 
Figure 1: LOAT (simplified version) 
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At level 1 the task is performed with 'primitive' technical tools, i.e. low-tech 
nondigital artefacts. From level 2 upwards, 'real' automation is involved, and 
the role of the machine becomes increasingly significant, up to the level where 
the task is fully automated. A certain technology may have different levels of 
automation under the four cognitive functions, expressing varying levels of 
interaction between humans and technology. 
In the following the IBM Watson system is considered as an example of AI CDSS, 
and its levels of automation are assessed. Even though this section is mainly 
focused on Watson, results can be extended to all AI CDSS systems sharing 
similar features and levels of automation. A complete technological analysis, 
especially with regard to the level of automation, should always be grounded 
in the technical specifications of the AI system in question and in its concept of 
operations. Watson was chosen as a focus of investigation because ample 
information is available about its functioning and architecture.48 Additionally, 
Watson is a representative example of AI CDSS as reported in the literature.49 
 
48 For a general overview on Watson, see for instance Kevin D Ashley, Artificial 
Intelligence and Legal Analytics: New Tools for Law Practice in the Digital Age 
(Cambridge University Press 2017) 
49 See, for example Alicja, Piotrkowicz, Johnson Owen, and Geoff Hall. 'Finding relevant 
free-text radiology reports at scale with IBM Watson Content Analytics: a feasibility 
study in the UK NHS.' (2019) 10(1) Journal of biomedical semantics 21. David Ferrucci, 
Anthony Levas, Sugato Bagchi, David Gondek, and Erik T Mueller, 'Watson: beyond 
jeopardy!' (2013) Artificial Intelligence 199, 93–105; Marjorie Glass Zauderer, Ayca 
 As concerns information acquisition (A), Watson supports human experts in 
acquiring information on the process they are following. The system integrates 
data from different sources, such as personal health records, medical datasets 
containing domain-specific literature, and clinical trial reports. It then filters 
and/or highlights the relevant information items by selecting, for example, the 
results of clinical trials on cancer diseases rather than leukaemia. The criteria 
for integrating, filtering, and highlighting the relevant information are 
predefined at design level and not available to physicians. Thus, with regard to 
the first cognitive function, Watson reaches level A5 (full automation support 
of information acquisition). 
As concerns the second cognitive function, namely the analysis of information 
(B), Watson compares and analyses the available data based on parameters 
defined at design level, reaching level B5 (full automation support of 
information analysis). In the LOAT classification, this level usually implies that 
the system triggers visual and/or sound alerts whenever a certain result 
requires human expert attention. Consider, for instance, an arrhythmia-
detection alert generated by an electrocardiograph (ECG). Even though we can 
imagine a near future in which Watson will be connected to other kinds of 
medical devices, such as ECGs, the analysis of information lies in the internal 
process of the system, and it is not accessible to human experts. 
With regard to decision and action selection (C), Watson generates a ranked 
list of diagnoses (differential diagnosis) with an associated confidence score. It 
proposes one or more alternative decisions to clinicians, leaving them the 
possibility and freedom to generate alternative options. The ability to explore 
alternative hypotheses (diagnoses), along with the confidence score and the 
associated supporting evidence, is a key feature of the DeepQA technology. 
Physicians can evaluate these diagnoses along different kinds of evidence 
extracted from a patient's electronic medical record (EMR) and other related 
sources of data. These kinds of evidence include symptoms, findings, patient 
history, family history, current medications, demographics, and so on. Each 
 
Gucalp, Andrew S. Epstein, Andrew D. Seidman, Aryeh Caroline, Svetlana Granovsky, 
Julia Fu, Jeffrey Keesing, Scott Lewis, Heather Co, Het al. Piloting IBM Watson 
Oncology within Memorial Sloan Kettering's regional network, (2014) 32(15) Journal 
of Clinical Oncology 2014. 
 diagnosis links back to the original evidence that DeepQA uses to produce the 
associated confidence scores, and it supports the adoption of evidence-based 
medicine. Physicians can select any of the alternative diagnoses proposed by 
the system, or they can choose their own diagnosis, whenever, for example, 
they are aware of contextual circumstances (e.g. a certain medical condition, 
the patient's values, and others) unknown to or ignored by the system, as well 
as in cases where they have evidence of errors by the AI system. As a 
consequence, under the third cognitive function, the system reaches level C2 
(automated decision support). 
As it concerns action implementation (D), namely the administration of medical 
treatments, human experts (physicians, caregivers, etc) execute and control all 
actions without any kind of AI system intervention. Thus, Watson reaches level 
D0 (manual action and control). 
It clearly appears that, even though Watson reaches full automation in 
information acquisition and analysis, physicians may play a central role with 
regard to the selection of decisions and actions, as well as to their 
implementation. This task allocation raises questions with regard to the source 
of decision-making authority, as analysed in the following section.  
5. THE SOURCE OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY AND THE ROLE OF WATSON IN HEALTH CARE 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in examining the role of 
AI in decision-making and whether it should be used for supporting or 
augmenting human decision-making or rather for replacing and automating 
the whole process.50 These technologies expand the scale of collected and 
processed evidence, broadening the questions about whether human experts 
 
50 See for example S Miller, 'AI: Augmentation, more so than automation' (2018) 5(1) 
Asian Management Insights 1–20. The author argues the imperative of a new human-
machine symbiosis and calls for the rethink of 'how humans and machines need to 
work symbiotically to augment and enhance each other's capabilities'. See also J 
Wilson, and PR Daugherty, 'Collaborative Intelligence: Humans and Al are joining 
forces.' (2018) 96(4) Harvard Business Review 115–123; and Council of Europe, Study 
on the Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing Techniques (in 
particular algorithms) and Possible Regulatory Implications (2017) 3. 
 can still cope with the expertise and capacity of AI systems, and whether there 
is the need to rethink the role of humans in the decision-making process. 
Given the characteristic features of Watson and those of new AI-CDSS sharing 
similar levels of automation, in particular with regard to information 
acquisition and analysis, this section investigates whether the source of 
decision-making authority should be attributed only to human experts (e.g. 
clinicians and physicians) or it should be completely shifted to AI systems or, 
finally, whether a shared decision-making model is possible and even 
preferable. 
Human decision-making authority. In the first hypothesis, human decision-
making authority, the AI system would be considered as a simple information-
management tool supporting human experts. The standard of care would 
remain what is reasonable to expect from the average physician in the specific 
medical field in question. 
However, AI technologies such as Watson are purposely designed to interfere 
with human-decision making:51 they are used on the assumption that they can 
outperform humans, overcoming not only their cognitive limitations52 but also 
time-sensitive ones in accessing, reading, understanding,53 and incorporating 
evidence.54 According to some scholars, this assumption would provide the 
basis for relinquishing control to AI CDSS, like Watson, as the better approach 
 
51 Andrew D Selbst, 'Negligence and AI's Human Users' (March 11, 2019) Boston 
University Law Review (forthcoming); UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper 
No. 20-01, 16. Available at SSRN  <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350508> accessed 27 
June 2020. 
52 See for example Deskus, C. 'Fifth Amendment Limitations on Criminal Algorithmic 
Decision-Making' (2018) NYUJ Legis. Pubs & Pubs. Pol'y 21, 237, 250, stating that 
human capacity for judgement is inferior to that of mathematical models when it 
comes to prognostic evaluations. 
53 Andrew D. Selbst, and Solon Barocas, 'The intuitive appeal of explainable machines' 
(2018) 87 Fordham L. Rev.  1085. 
54 Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 'IBM to Collaborate in Applying Watson 
Technology to Help Oncologists' press release 
<press/us/en/pressrelease/37235.wss#resource> accessed 28 march 2019. 
 to reach the gold standard of evidence-based practice.55 If there is strong 
evidence to suggest a particular diagnosis-and-treatment procedure, then that 
diagnosis and treatment is the most justifiable one.  
AI decision-making authority. The second hypothesis, shifting the decision-
making authority to AI CDSS, is indeed generally supported by two main 
arguments: (1) the normative pull of evidence-based practice,56 which it would 
be questionable to ignore; and (2) the greater success rate over human experts. 
On this hypothesis, medical malpractice law would eventually require a 
superior ML-generated medical diagnosis as the standard of care in clinical 
settings.57 As a consequence, medical experts, not being in a position to reach 
the same standard, would be bound by the decisions of AI systems, even in 
cases where such decisions go beyond their comprehension and control. In the 
event of failures resulting in patients being harmed or injured, any departure 
from the advice of an AI system may lead to the physician being held 
professionally liable for medical negligence.58 
Relinquishing control to AI systems in medicine raises some legal issues with 
regard to (i) patients' peculiarities and the concept of evidence-based 
medicine; (ii) the role of explanation in decision-making; and (iii) the role of 
trust in medical practice. 
1. Patients' peculiarities and the concept of evidence-based medicine 
The first issue has to do with patients' uniqueness and the concept of evidence-
based medicine. Even though the latter is regarded as the gold standard, and 
 
55 Jason Millar and Ian R Kerr, 'Delegation, Relinquishment, and Responsibility: The 
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accessed 27 June 2020. 
56 Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 'IBM to Collaborate in Applying Watson 
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57 A Michael Froomkin, Ian R Kerr, and Joëlle Pineau, 'When AIs Outperform Doctors: 
Confronting the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning' 
(2019) 61(1) Arizona Law Review 33. 
58 Jeffrey M. Senger, and Patrik O'Leary, 'Big data and human medical judgment 
regulating next-generation clinical decision support' in Glenn Cohen, Holly F. Lynch, 
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 is considered the best argument in favour of AI decision-making authority, a 
number of limitations and criticisms emerge when evidence-based medicine is 
applied to individual patients. These criticisms point to the occurrence of 
biological variations, the need to consider the individual patient's values, and 
the limits in describing evidence to patients in order to facilitate shared 
decision-making.59 A broader understanding of evidence-based medicine 
'requires a bottom up approach that integrates the best external evidence with 
individual clinical expertise and patients' choices.'60  
Although it is true that the alternative to AI evidence-based diagnosis is not a 
perfect diagnosis but rather human diagnosis with all their flaws, the care 
process should be regarded as a complex and multidimensional concept. It can 
not only be based on the best external evidence supporting a specific diagnosis 
and treatment,61 but should also consider the uniqueness of patients, their 
biological variations, and the diversity of individual values, moral attitudes, 
goals, and choices. 
In this regard, medical experts cannot be reduced to that of mere executors of 
AI systems' advice or to that of intermediaries between AI CDSS and patients. 
In many cases, the best solution consists in integrating human and automated 
judgements by enabling physicians to review and eventually adapt the 
suggestions of AI to individual patients' goals and preferences. Moreover, the 
limitation in accessing and describing evidence is directly related to the second 
issue, namely the role of explanation in decision-making.  
2. The role of explanation in decision-making 
The second issue concerns AI explainability and accountability, and the 
possibility of obtaining human-intelligible and human-actionable information. 
As noted in section 0, AI CDSS like Watson are essentially black-box systems, in 
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 other words opaque systems62 that provide diagnosis and treatment 
recommendations without supporting explanations. They lack the capability to 
explain the internal process of reasoning behind the decision-making, or the 
reasons why decisions are made in a certain way and/or why they are 
recommended. These decisions, in other words, do not come with any 
supporting justifications. Medical experts make diagnoses by relying on 
multiple sources of knowledge, such as scientific literature, relevant past cases, 
and their trained common sense. They also use these sources of knowledge for 
generating explanations and ground their diagnoses and treatment decisions. 
The question is whether and to what extent statistical evidence provided by AI 
CDSS like Watson – referring to probabilities or statistical relationships 
between certain symptoms and diagnoses or between specific treatments and 
recovery – is sufficient to provide an exhaustive explanation. The explainability 
of AI systems is required as well under Articles 13 and 14 GDPR, according to 
which 'meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the 
significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing' is to be 
provided when decision-making is automated. Indeed, AI explainability has 
recently become central in the scientific debate as one of the core principles in 
developing AI systems, along with the principles of beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy, and justice.63 Some authors have raised the question 
whether the explanation should provide an account of (a) all the patterns and 
variables taken into account by the system (a model-centric explanation) or (b) 
only those that are relevant to the specific patient's case (subject-centric 
explanation).64 Regardless of the ability to outperform human experts, the 
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 explanation plays an essential role in the medical decision-making process for 
both medical experts and patients.  
To properly understand the concept of explanation and its role within the 
health domain, we need to focus on who the explanation is provided for. As 
noted by Miller,65 explanation can also be seen as a communication problem. 
From this perspective, it is necessary to consider the interaction between two 
roles, explainer and explainee, recognising that there are certain 'rules' that 
govern this interaction. Indeed, the concept of explanation may assume 
different meanings, being subject to specific rules, depending on what 
perspective is adopted. Furthermore, different aspects may be relevant, 
depending on whether the explainee is the medical expert or the patient.  
From a computer-science perspective the explanation needs to include three 
elements. First of all, it needs a model explanation, i.e. an interpretable and 
transparent model, capturing the whole logic of the obscure system. Secondly,  
it requires a model inspection, i.e. a human-comprehensible representation of 
the specific properties of an opaque system and its prediction, making it 
possible to understand how the black box behaves internally depending on the 
input values, namely its sensitivity to certain attributes (e.g. specific 
symptoms), up to and including, for instance, the connections in a neural 
network. Finally, it needs an outcome explanation, making it possible to 
understand the reasons for certain decisions, i.e. the causal chains leading to a 
certain outcome in a particular instance.66 
While the first two models, the model explanation and the model inspection, 
seem to be mostly directed at computer scientists and IT experts, the outcome 
explanation is also relevant for medical experts, for a variety of reasons. 
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 First, research in social science suggests that providing explanations for 
recommended actions deeply influences users' confidence in, and acceptance 
of, AI-based decisions and recommendations.67 From this perspective, medical 
experts would benefit from causal explanation, providing the rationales behind 
AI decisions and facilitating further investigations. Physicians should be able to 
assess the coherence of the arguments supporting the suggestions of the 
system in relation to the medical literature, clinical practice, past cases similar 
to the one in question, and individual patients. The explanation would also 
enable physicians to determine the extent to which a particular input was 
determinative or influential in yielding the output68 and to evaluate whether 
and to what extent they can rely on the AI CDSS recommendations.  
For instance, it may prove necessary to determine whether a patient's interests 
were taken into account in recommending a certain diagnosis and treatment, 
as well as whether a certain factor (e.g. a certain symptom, the patient's age) 
was crucial in determining the diagnosis at issue and the suggested treatment. 
From this perspective, the role of medical experts remains central in 
considering factors which may affect decisions, such as symptoms that AI CDSS 
are unable to perceive (e.g. a specific body odor or the consistency of tissue to 
the touch) and the patient's values, attitudes, and preferences. As experts in 
the medical domain, physicians are the only ones who can integrate such 
factors with the evidence and suggestions provided by AI CDSS.69 All these 
factors are necessary for eventually identifying possible counterarguments, 
which, if taken into account, may lead to different decisions. Thus, medical 
experts should play an oversight and monitoring role. This is even more 
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 relevant and necessary if we consider that current AI CDSS do not support a 
meaningful explanation function.  
 On the other hand, explanation is essential for patients as well, making it 
possible to ensure a patient-centered care process, informed decision-making 
with regard to care and treatment, and ultimately the acceptability of medical 
advice.Thus, if not only physicians but also patients are considered as 
addressees of the explanation, its dialectical dimension becomes crucial, in 
particular to make the explanation accessible and comprehensible to non-
domain experts and to laypersons.  
From this perspective, social scientists have focused on the communicative 
aspect of explanation, arguing for the following approaches70: (i) contrastive 
explanation; (ii) selective explanation; (iii) causal explanation; and (iv) social 
explanation. While contrastive explanation is used to specify what input values 
determined the adoption of a certain decision (e.g. treating the condition with 
certain drugs) rather than possible alternatives (e.g. recommending a different 
drug or a surgical procedure), selective explanation is based on those factors 
that are most relevant according to human judgments. The latter is the case 
since causal chains are often too large to comprehend,71 especially for those 
who lack the specific domain competence, such as patients. Causal explanation 
focuses on causes, rather than on merely statistical correlations. If we consider 
patients as addressees, the most likely explanation is not always the best 
explanation. Referring to probabilities and statistical generalizations, provided 
by AI CDSS, is not as effective as referring to causes; for example, a certain 
diagnosis or medical treatment can be explained by the patient's clinical 
condition, rather than by the kind of symptoms that are common to patients 
affected by a certain disease. Finally, the explanation has a social nature. It is 
useful to adopt an interactive and conversational approach in which 
information is tailored to the recipient's beliefs and way of understanding. For 
instance, physicians may need to keep track of the state of the explanation by 
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 noting what has been already communicated to the patient and inferring what 
the patient has inferred him/herself.  
In this dialectical sense, the role of medical experts would remain essential not 
only in making explanations accessible and meaningful to patients, but also in 
tailoring such explanations to individual patients, possibly considering their 
emotional state and reactions as well. Even if we imagine a future where AI 
systems will be able to provide human-understandable evidence and 
explanations, physicians would not be reduced to acting as mere 
intermediaries, for two reasons. First, only medical experts have the specific 
domain knowledge needed to interpret the pull of evidence and explanation 
— assuming AI explainability — and to evaluate its reliability and correctness. 
Secondly, in the ability to explain lies the keystone of the interaction and 
relationship of trust between doctors and patients across the entire care 
process as they cooperate in devising a treatment. 
3. The role of trust in medical practice 
As a consequence, the third issue pertains to trust. Trust is traditionally 
considered a cornerstone of interpersonal relationships,72 and in health care it 
is regarded as the effective foundation of the patient-doctor relationship. The 
need for interpersonal trust is owed to the patient's vulnerability, to the 
information asymmetry deriving from the specialistic nature of medical 
knowledge,73 and to the uncertainty regarding the skills and intentions of the 
physician, on whom the patient is dependent. Where trust is concerned, 
arguing in favour of the decision-making authority of AI CDSS would necessarily 
undermine the patient-doctor relationship, which would be replaced with a 
patient-AI system relationship. This would ultimately lead to a concurrent 
transfer of the trustee role from medical experts to AI CDSS. 
The patient-doctor trust relationship can, for different reasons, be argued to 
be still essential in the care process. First, medical competence encompasses 
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 more than knowledge, judgment, and skill in technical functions; it also lies in 
the ability to help patients feel at ease, conversing with them sensitively and 
effectively to elicit relevant symptoms and patient's concerns, and providing 
responsive and meaningful feedback.74 Removing such interpersonal human 
skills from the trust relationship may undermine the patient's trust in the 
competence of AI CDSS, even leading to a mistrust and unwillingness to follow 
the advice of AI. 
A further reason has to do with the information asymmetry owed to the 
specialistic nature of medical knowledge. Even though this asymmetry also 
shapes the relationship between the medical expert and the AI CDSS, the 
imbalance would be even greater when it comes to patients, since they cannot 
be expected to have any domain-specific knowledge and would thus typically 
never be able to understand and interpret data and assess evidence and 
explanations. A meaningful understanding of the data, as well as the ability to 
access evidence and explanations, is essential to making informed decisions 
about whether to opt in or to opt out of AI recommendations. 
The shared decision-making model. Given the criticisms just mentioned, 
neither the human decision-making authority model nor the AI decision-
making authority model is supported here. Both models fail to fully explain the 
allocation of tasks and roles in the interaction between medical experts and AI 
CDSS in the healthcare STS. Thus, a shared decision-making authority model is 
here advocated. This model rests on the concept of a joint cognitive system. It 
has been observed that when humans and AI systems interact in working 
toward a goal, it would be better to describe humans and technology not as 
two interacting 'components' but as making up a joint cognitive system, where 
control is shared between the human cognitive system and the AI system.75 
Thus, tasks traditionally associated with the role of physician will be attributed 
to the joint cognitive system, so that they are distributed between the human 
expert and the AI CDSS. From this perspective, the standard of care would 
result from a combination of the standard of care for medical practice and the 
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 standard resulting from ML-generated medical diagnosis. The first dimension 
should be taken into account with regard to the tasks assigned to the human 
expert, while the second one to those assigned to the AI CDSS. 
As a result, the human should maintain the ability to oversee the AI CDSS 
overall activity (including its legal and ethical impact in the care process) and 
the ability to decide whether and how to use the system and rely on its 
recommendations. In case of failure resulting in injuries for patients, liability 
should be assessed taking account the task allocation as discussed in section 0. 
The shared model allows physicians grounding their decisions not only in the 
pool of literature and clinical evidence, but also in the individual patient's 
biological variation, values, and preferences, as well as in factors the AI CDSS is 
unable to properly perceive, including their emotional state and beliefs. 
The reliability of a decision will be based on both statistical evidence and the 
physician's ability to interpret such evidence — at least when it comes to 
detecting whether or not there is good evidence contradicting the AI 
suggestion or evidence of errors by the AI CDSS — and to provide meaningful 
explanations to patients. 
This model leads to a three-dimensional trust relationship involving the AI 
CDSS, the human expert, and the patient. In the context of AI, control over the 
system is constitutive of trust.76 As noted, given the specialistic nature of 
medical knowledge, such control can be exercised only by medical experts, at 
least partly, while avoiding the risk of exacerbating the information asymmetry 
between AI and patients. 
The patient-doctor trust relationship would remain unchanged, relying on the 
full and deep concept of medical competence.  
In conclusion, AI CDSS cannot replace the human expert as the source of 
decision-making authority, which remains essential when interpreting 
evidence, detecting AI CDSS errors, and providing explanations to patients. 
Furthermore, the human expert is needed in order to take account of the 
 
76 Cristiano Castelfranchi and Rino Falcone, 'Trust and Control: A Dialectic Link' (2000) 
14(8) Applied Artificial Intelligence 799. 
 patient's legal and ethical values and principles, preferences and morality, and 
other information not available or accessible to such systems. 
6. VARIATIONS ON A THEME: POSSIBLE FAILURES AND LIABILITY SCENARIOS 
In the previous sections, the levels of automation of Watson and its influence 
and role in the decision-making process have been analysed. The findings 
provide the basis for assessing the connection between delegation and 
responsibilities. In particular, this section provides variations on some possible 
failures in the decision-making process and the related liability assessment in 
the event of injuries suffered by a patient as a consequence of misdiagnosis 
and/or improper treatment.  
As previously noted, Watson is used to analyse symptoms, make a diagnosis, 
and find the most appropriate treatment for specific diseases. In particular, it 
acquires the relevant information, integrating data from different sources, and 
analyses the available data. The system generates a number of hypotheses, 
before going through a process of evidence-testing. 
Watson collects and classifies all potentially emerging diagnoses and the 
respective therapeutic plans, assigning specific confidence scores to them and 
ranking answers according to the probability of their being correct. In this way, 
the system supports the adoption of evidence-based medicine, taking the best 
available evidence obtained from the scientific method and applying that 
evidence to medical decision-making through an abductive reasoning process 
in the form of inference to the best explanation.77 
As an example, it will be helpful to consider a case where a patient dies as a 
consequence of misdiagnosis or improper medical treatment. In order to 
assess the allocation of liability, we have designed four main scenarios. Each 
scenario is related to a failure in the execution of a specific cognitive function 
in the decision-making process. 
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 1. Failures in the acquisition-of-information phase 
In a first scenario, the patient's death is causally related to a failure in the 
acquisition-of-information phase. In this scenario, two different hypotheses 
can be considered: 
Hypothesis 1: missing, incorrect, and/or incomplete source information. 
Here, some information—such as a personal health record, the literature 
dataset, or the clinical trial reports—is missing, incorrect, or incomplete. We 
are dealing with an error not in the acquisition phase but rather in the source 
information. Watson may not be able to detect such an error, which might be 
owed to different causes, such as a human error (by physicians, nurses, 
knowledge engineers and so on) in collecting and recording the information, or 
a technical failure in the medical examination process (for example an ECG 
malfunction). Under this hypothesis, it seems that liability cannot be attributed 
to the medical staff that is using Watson or to the actors involved in the system 
development and certification process. 
Hypothesis 2: failure in retrieving and selecting the relevant information. 
In this scenario, the failure is caused by an error in retrieving and selecting 
relevant information in making a diagnosis and recommending a medical 
treatment. According to the classification laid out in section 0, Watson reaches 
level A5 (full automation support of information acquisition). As noted, the 
criteria for integrating, filtering, and highlighting the relevant information are 
defined in advance at design level and are not available to physicians. As a 
consequence, liability may be attributed to the actors involved in defining such 
criteria and in the design process. Actors involved in the certification process, 
such as the notified body and members of the expert panel, may be found 
liable only if they were involved in evaluating and assessing the system design. 
Under this hypothesis, liability should not be attributed to users, i.e. the 
medical staff using Watson, since they usually do not intervene in retrieving, 
integrating, filtering, and highlighting the relevant information. 
It may be asked whether the system user interface should be designed so as to 
alert the human expert if some critical information is unavailable or 
unreadable. Consider, for instance, the case in which Watson, failing to detect 
that a certain patient is pregnant, recommends drugs that cannot be 
 administered to pregnant women, in that they may cause serious problems in 
the foetus. In these cases, additional liabilities may be attributed to the 
manufacturer for the defective design of the interface (not providing the alert) 
and to the medical staff for ignoring the missing-information alert. 
It should be noted that since the criteria for the acquisition of information are 
defined at design level, if the system is certified under the full quality-assurance 
procedure, the legitimate expectation principle should shield the human 
expert from liability in choosing to trust the system and its ability to carry out 
the delegated task. The only exception lies in cases where the human expert is 
aware or should have been aware that some relevant information was missing, 
or when there is evidence that he or she was negligent in ignoring the missing-
information alert. 
2. Failure in the information-analysis phase 
Also worth considering are cases of failure in the information-analysis phase, 
involving the generation of a diagnosis, the evaluation of positive and negative 
evidence supporting or rejecting each diagnosis and possible treatments, and 
the assignment of the related confidence scores. According to the classification 
laid out in section 0, Watson reaches level B5 (full automation support of 
information analysis). As noted, the parameters for comparing and analysing 
the available data are defined in advance at design level (and may not be visible 
to physicians, and in any case may not be meaningful for humans).78 Under this 
hypothesis, liability may be attributed to the manufacturer, where a design 
defect or a manufacturing defect occurs as a consequence of selecting and 
implementing certain parameters in the design process, as well as to the 
notified body and members of the expert panel, if they were involved in 
evaluating and assessing the system design and functioning.79  
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 As in the previous scenario, the parameters for analysing information are 
defined at design level. Thus, if the system is certified under the full quality-
assurance procedure, the legitimate expectation principle should shield the 
human expert from liability in choosing to trust the system and its ability to 
carry out the delegated task. The only exception would be the case where the 
human expert negligently ignored an alert. 
Additionally, since AI CDSS like Watson are capable of analysing and processing 
massive amounts of information80 in a way that would be impossible for any 
human expert, and their output is not fully predictable, it is not reasonable to 
assign to such experts the legal duty to be in control of the internal processing 
activity of the system. 
3. Failure in the decision-and-action-selection phase 
On the basis of the results that have emerged from information analysis, 
Watson generates a ranked list of diagnoses with associated confidence scores, 
proposing alternative diagnoses and the associated treatments. It thus leaves 
clinicians the possibility and freedom to select the best hypothesis and/or to 
generate alternative options. According to the classification set out in section 
0, Watson reaches level C2 (automated decision support). In this scenario, 
different hypotheses may be considered. 
Hypothesis 1: Watson generates a correct diagnosis, along with an associated 
treatment. In the following, four different sub-hypotheses are considered: 
a) The diagnosis and the associated treatment generated by Watson are 
both correct, and the human expert follows its suggestion. This case is 
relatively unproblematic, since no conflict emerges between the human 
expert and the AI system, and no failures can be detected at the 
decision-and-action-selection stage. 
b) The diagnosis and the associated treatment are both correct, but the 
human expert does not follow the system suggestion; (s)he may, for 
instance, generate a new diagnosis or a different treatment. Under this 
sub-hypothesis, a failure may emerge from the divergent human 
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 expert's decision. From a liability perspective, some authors have noted 
that the outcome depends on which expert judgment will be considered 
as the source of the decision-making authority.81 In particular, if Watson 
is considered as such a source, then liability can be attributed to human 
experts (e.g. the liability of physicians) under a specific duty to follow 
the advice of the system. Any divergent decision should be considered 
a violation of such a duty. However, as noted in section 0, given the trust 
relationship82 between patients and doctors, it is debatable whether 
Watson should be considered a decision-making authority. Conversely, 
both on human-expert and shared decision-making authority models, 
their liability should be connected to cases of medical negligence and/or 
malpractice. In this case, the full quality-assurance certification process 
may work as a guarantee of the system trustworthiness,83 and may be 
considered the effective cornerstone for the applicability of the 
legitimate expectation principle. 
c) The diagnosis is correct, but the associated treatment is wrong, and the 
human expert follows the suggestion of the system. One might want to 
consider here the case where the wrong treatment derives from an 
internal failure of the system in generating the medical treatment. In 
this case, the manufacturer may be found liable for the defective 
technology, and so may the notified body and the members of the 
expert panel, if during the full quality-assurance procedure some 
anomalies emerged in the clinical testing phase. Conversely, it is 
doubtful that the physicians' liability can be based solely on following 
the suggestion of the system, with the exception of cases where they 
had good evidence contradicting the advice of the system or had 
evidence-based reasons for not trusting such advice, e.g. on the basis of 
wrong results in similar previous cases. Thus, on the shared decision-
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 making-authority model, the liability shield can be grounded in the 
application of the legitimate expectation principle whenever the system 
has been certified under the full quality-assurance procedure and the 
former relies on a correct performance of the delegated task. The wrong 
treatment may also result from the negligent behaviour of the human 
medical experts who neglect specific contextual circumstances such as 
a medical condition of the patient unknown to or ignored by Watson, as 
in the example of drugs administered to pregnant women. 
d) The diagnosis is correct, but the associated treatment is wrong, and the 
human expert does not follow the suggestion of the system. This case is 
relatively unproblematic with regard to a possible conflict between the 
human expert and the AI system. In the event of undesirable outcomes, 
the liability of human experts may derive only from their negligent 
behaviour and/or medical malpractice. 
Hypothesis 2: Watson generates a wrong diagnosis and an associated 
treatment. In the following, two relevant sub-hypotheses are considered: 
a) Both the diagnosis and the associated treatment generated by Watson 
are wrong, and the human expert follows the suggestion of the system. 
In this case, the manufacturer may be found liable for the defective 
technology, and so may the notified body and the members of the 
expert panel, if they were involved in the assurance procedure and 
some anomalies emerged in the clinical testing phase. It is debatable 
whether the liability of human experts may be based solely on their 
having followed the advice of the system, with the exception of cases 
where they had good evidence contradicting the suggestion of the 
system or evidence-based reasons for not trusting such advice, e.g. on 
the basis of wrong results in similar previous cases. As noted, under the 
full quality-assurance procedure, the liability shield should be grounded 
not in the human expert's delegation of such authority to the AI system 
but rather in the application of the legitimate expectation principle. 
b) Both the diagnosis and the associated treatment are wrong, but the 
human expert does not follow the suggestion of the system. Even 
though a conflict between the human expert and the AI system 
emerged, this case remains unproblematic, since undesirable outcomes 
 may only result from the negligent behaviour of clinicians and/or their 
medical malpractice. 
4. Failure in the action-implementation phase 
In this scenario, a possible failure may only result from the human expert's 
behaviour, as in cases where caregivers overdose the drugs to be administered. 
As noted in section 0, under LOAT, Watson reaches level D0 (manual action and 
control), since the human expert executes and controls all actions without any 
kind of AI system intervention. Therefore, liability may only be attributed to 
human experts, for example clinicians and caregivers, as a result of negligent 
behaviour and/or medical malpractice. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this contribution, the liability issues emerging from the adoption of AI CDSS 
in healthcare was explored from a socio-technical perspective by analysing the 
technological features of new-generation AI CDSS compared to traditional 
ones; the regulatory framework in place, especially with regard to the legal 
qualification of AI CDSS and the certification procedures; and the allocation of 
decision-making tasks between medical experts and AI systems. The adopted 
systemic approach shed light on the functioning of the healthcare system, 
making it possible to assign liability by analyzing the human-machine 
interaction. 
With regard to the technological component of the healthcare STS, the specific 
features of new AI CDSS are going to improve the quality of health care and 
patients' safety, given their ability to outperform medical experts in certain 
activities, such as clinical diagnosis and treatment recommendations.  
However, we showed how such features coupled with and the highest level of 
automation in performing different cognitive tasks can have a stronger impact 
on both the decision-making process and the inherent risk posed by AI medical 
devices.  
From the social-component perspective, the regulatory framework in place, 
and in particular the criteria for assessing the risk class of medical devices and 
the related conformity-assessment procedures, does not consider the level of 
 automation of a medical device as a risk factor. However, automation may 
affect medical practice, influencing or even directing clinicians' decisions. Thus, 
rather than focusing on the intended use of medical devices, the classification 
criterion should take account of the level of automation. Indeed, the latter may 
affect how the decision-making process is split between human experts (e.g. 
physicians) and AI systems, also becoming a criterion by which to assess 
possible liabilities in case of failure. 
With regard to the interaction between medical experts and AI CDSS, some 
scholars considered their ability to outperform humans in diagnosis and 
recommendations as one of the main reasons to doubt that humans can still 
be considered as the source of decision-making authority. In fact, AI systems 
have demonstrated an ability to successfully act in a domain traditionally 
entrusted to the trained intuition and analysis of humans. 
However, relinquishing control to AI systems presents some challenges. 
Although it is true that the alternative to AI diagnosis is not a perfect diagnosis, 
but rather human diagnoses with all their flaws, the care process should be 
regarded as a complex and multidimensional concept. It cannot only be based 
on the best external evidence supporting a specific diagnosis and treatment, 
but should also consider the uniqueness of patients, their biological variations 
and the diversity of individual values, moral attitudes, goals and choices. 
Medical experts cannot be reduced to mere executors of AI systems' advice or 
to intermediaries between AI CDSS and patients. In many cases, the best 
solution consists in integrating human and automated judgments by enabling 
physicians to review AI suggestions and patients to request a meaningful 
explanation of the diagnosis and the recommended treatment, taking account 
of its communicative and dialectical dimension. If the trustworthiness and 
explainability of AI are to be promoted, there will need to be an emphasis on 
transparency, while developing methods and technologies that enable human 
experts to analyse and review automated decision-making. 
The future challenge will consist in finding the best combination between 
human intelligence and AI intelligence, taking into account the capacities and 
the limitations of both. On these grounds, an argument was made here in 
favour of a shared decision-making authority model, which relies on a broader 
understanding of evidence-based medicine and the care process. On this 
 model, the reliability of a decision will depend not only on the statistical 
evidence generated by the AI system but also on physicians' ability to interpret 
such evidence. From this perspective, the standard of care would be 
determined by combining the standard of care for human-expert medical 
practice and the standard resulting from ML-generated evidence-based 
diagnosis. This model also leads to a three-dimensional trust relationship 
involving the AI system, the human expert, and the patient. Finally, a shared 
model is consistent with the concept of a joint cognitive system and the 
allocation of tasks between humans and AI, where control is accomplished by 
coupling the human cognitive system with an AI system that exhibits goal-
directed behaviour. 
All these elements were taken into account in analysing liability under the 
existing regulatory framework, given the technological features of AI CDSS, 
their level of automation, and their interaction with medical experts. The ways 
in which activities and the related liabilities are attributed and distributed 
between humans and AI systems should also be taken into account in a 
proactive way, during the design phase of a new operational concept/system, 
to address possible legal issues arising from future potential accidents or 
malfunctions. The adoption of a socio-technical perspective also makes it 
possible to assess and improve the existing regulatory framework by analysing 
legal risks that AI technology introduces in complex STS. 
In conclusion, if valuable practices surrounding the use of AI in the healthcare 
domain are to be promoted, it needs to be ensured that the development and 
deployment of AI tools takes place in a socio-technical framework — inclusive 
of technologies, human skills, organisational structures, and norms — where 
individual interests and the social good are both preserved and enhanced. 
